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Current rental housing assistance programs are not designed to provide a safety net for people whose 
lives are volatile, or to encourage poor people to live in good locations.  These failings can be corrected.  
HUD should establish a program of rental insurance—like mortgage insurance, but for renters.  Low-
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The rental market for lower income Americans can work a lot better than it has been working.  
Tenants (and the landlords who rent to them) can have more security than they have now. Fewer 
people can experience homelessness.  Subsidies can do more for the people who receive them, and for 
their neighbors.  This note explains how.  The key is thinking about security and externalities in 21st 
century terms, not in Great Depression terms. 
 I’ll look at two broad functions that government interventions in the housing market can 
perform: providing a safety net, and generating external benefits.  Our current system performs both 
functions poorly: it moves too slowly and too arbitrarily to insure people against most of the risks they 
face, and is least available precisely when most people need it the most; and most of the external 
benefits it generates are the ones that were important in the first half of the 20th century, not the ones 
that matter in the first half of the 21st. I’ll show how both functions can be performed better. I have 
suggestions for each of these two problems, and they can be considered independently. 
 My perspective in this note is overwhelmingly classical: I identify market failures and ask what 
steps can be taken to correct them. I also identify failures in current policies.  Rental markets for poor 
people would have some serious problems without significant government involvement, and they can 
still have serious problems if that involvement is not wise. 
1.0  A Better Safety Net 
1.1 Where we are now 
 Governments perform a useful function when they provide people with valuable insurance that 
markets would otherwise fail to provide.  The major kinds of shocks that affect poor people today are 
losses of income, losses of health, and losses of relationships (see O’Flaherty 2009).  Families insure 
these risks poorly (Dynarski and Gruber 1997, Bentolila and Ichino 2008).  Governments insure against 
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income shocks very little (especially for adults not accompanied by kids and those who have used up 
TANF eligibility), and insurance against health shocks is far from perfect (especially against the income 
losses that sometimes ensue from health shocks).  Neither governments nor private insurers offer much 
meaningful protection against relationship shocks. 
 None of these shocks is directly related to housing markets, but they all spill over into housing 
markets.  Food, clothing, transportation and housing are the main things that poor people buy, and rent 
is generally the largest single bill they receive in a month.  Rent is hard to adjust quickly (search and 
moving are expensive), and relatively easy to borrow against.  Gas stations and supermarkets won’t let 
you leave without paying, but landlords can’t evict you costlessly when you miss a payment. Thus 
landlords become insurers of last resort. 
 This has consequences.  Landlords aren’t good insurers, and most lack means to spread risk. So 
they charge too much for this insurance, they screen tenants too strictly, and they under-insure.  (To the 
extent that landlord-tenant law forces them to provide more insurance than they want to, landlords 
charge even more and screen even more strictly.)  Even large landlords with wealthy tenants find acting 
as an insurance company burdensome; evidence of this is the apparent success of Insurent, a private 
rental insurance company in New York City that specializes in large, high-end buildings. Tenant payment 
problems are correlated with the business cycle, and so confront landlords exactly when those landlords 
face the most severe cash flow problems from vacancies and tight money.  Most tenants, moreover, live 
in apartments owned by small landlords.  Structure size and ownership do not map perfectly into each 
other, but only 18 percent of tenants in 2009 lived in structures of twenty or more units (American 
Housing Survey). 
 Current housing subsidy programs do little to mitigate the risks that low-income households 
face.  For households who are already subsidized, rents fall when incomes fall or medical expenses rise, 
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and so this group has good insurance.  But lags are often long.  Current year’s rent is based on 
retrospective income, and reporting takes time.  The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), for 
instance, begins gathering retrospective income information five months before lease renewal (NYCHA 
2008). Thus by the end of a lease, income 29 months ago has more impact on current rent than income 
last month.  NYCHA has “emergency procedures,” but even these are slow.  Rent can be reduced during 
the term of a lease for a tenant who loses a job, but only after 13 weeks. 
But most poor households are not subsidized, and the connection between their misfortunes 
and any housing assistance they get is approximately zero.  Only if a shock lasts the very long time 
needed to get to the top of the relevant queue does the shock bring housing assistance, and only if the 
household was foresighted enough to apply early (and does not contain someone with a criminal 
record).   
 Indeed, households are least likely to get housing assistance when they are most likely to need 
it.  A household is most likely to need help when a recession hits—either nationally or just locally.  But 
that is when queues are most likely to be longest and help least likely to be forthcoming.  (Queues in 
recessions are likely to be long both because many people need help and because few assisted 
households are moving up and making way for others.  See Hungerford 1996, Olsen et al. 2005, 
Ambrose 2005.)  HUD assistance is like a stock with a huge beta, a fire department that avoids fires. 
 Homeless shelters are probably the most effective safety net in the housing market now, and in 
locations with a rich array of shelters or a right-to-housing, they may perform this function well.  But 
they are expensive and often demeaning.  Like hospital emergency rooms, shelters are necessary, but 
they are not a good substitute for a sound social insurance system. 
1.2  What to do 
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 Many economists (e.g., Olsen 2008) have argued for a needs-based housing assistance 
entitlement program, and on many grounds such a program would be a huge improvement over the 
current set-up.  An entitlement program could also offer much better insurance, since households in 
distress would not have to queue for assistance, and funding would automatically expand in recessions 
so that access would not become harder. 
 Entitlement programs have several drawbacks, however. Bureaucratically, they would be ill-
equipped to deal with volatile income, health, and relationships, although perhaps good information 
technology and careful design could create a nimble and fast system.  Current rationed housing 
assistance programs have small work disincentive effects (Ludwig and Jacob 2008, Susin 2005, Tatian 
and Snow 2005, Olsen et al. 2005, Shroder 2002), but if program entrance were more closely tied to 
income these effects might be larger.  Current programs probably have significant sharing-disincentive 
effects (Sinai and Waldfogel 2005, Ellen and O’Flaherty 2007), and an entitlement program would have 
these effects too, unless it were restructured to be sharing-neutral.1  And entitlement programs could 
be expensive (although Olsen (2008) shows some controversial ways that their costs could be 
considerably reduced, but does not require sharing-neutrality, which any sensible program might have).   
1.2.1 Rental insurance basics 
 The most straightforward way to provide insurance is to provide insurance, and it is likely to be 
the cheapest way too.  The federal government already insures mortgages through the VA and the FHA, 
and mortgage-backed securities through the GSEs (although this last role may not be continuing).  Under 
some circumstances, this insurance costs the government nothing, although, of course, those are not 




 The basic idea is that a tenant pays a small premium when she leases an apartment.  If some 
predetermined event like a job loss, divorce, or major illness occurs during the term of the lease and 
makes it impossible for her to keep up with the rent, the insurance kicks in and pays the landlord a fixed 
amount (say $500) for a fixed number of months (say six months).  After the tenant stabilizes her life, 
the government might seek some repayment, but probably not full repayment.  As mentioned, at least 
one private profit-making company, Insurent in New York, sells rental insurance now, and so the 
concept is not totally infeasible. 
 What are the benefits of such insurance?  Landlords could relax their screening criteria, require 
smaller deposits, and charge lower rents; all tenants would benefit.  Tenants who encountered setbacks 
would have breathing room to resolve their problems, or to reduce their consumption deliberately.  
Social agencies and homelessness prevention services could receive informative advance warnings, and 
possibly target their activities better.  Children might not have to move so often, and the length of 
assistance could even be targeted to the school year.  Shelters would see fewer families who were 
temporarily down on their luck. 
 This rental insurance program would not insure against rapid rises in the market price of rental 
housing.  The moral hazard problems would be too great.  Fortunately, rent shocks do not appear to be 
a major risk that poor people face or a major direct precursor to homelessness (O’Flaherty 2009). 
1.2.2 Why not just make other safety-net programs better? 
 Is rental insurance is just a weak and politically expedient substitute for a more generous social 
insurance system, one with larger cash payments and more sensitive triggers?  I think not.  Two sets of 
market failures make rental insurance desirable in itself. 
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 The first and probably most important market failures are the external costs of homelessness 
and of instability for children whose parents do not fully internalize their academic progress.  Because of 
these external costs, the government has an interest in maintaining a tenancy even when a household 
head would prefer to use the same amount of money for some other purpose, even ex ante. 
 The second market failure is the inability to write enforceable contracts promising the payment 
of rent.  Partly this inability arises from state landlord-tenant codes that make instantaneous eviction 
impossible; but even without these codes few landlords would evict all tenants who were a few days 
late on the rent and promised to pay next week.  Because such contracts are not available, some Pareto-
improving tenancies never occur.  (An equivalent insurance contract would compensate landlords for 
tenant delinquencies.  This contract also appears to be unavailable.) 
 Some might argue that tenancies can be long-term relationships with flexible prices, and so all 
mutually beneficial insurance arrangements can be worked out over time.  But tenancies can become 
long-term only if they are allowed to become so, and all tenancies start short.  Hubert (1995) and Miceli 
and Sirmans (1999) show that serious adverse selection problems prevent first-best contracts from 
being negotiated in tenancies that have a chance of becoming long-term, essentially because incentive-
compatibility constraints need to be satisfied.  Benjamin et al. (1998) estimate that tenants who are 
liquidity constrained and cannot make security deposits borrow effectively from landlords at an annual 
interest rate of around 30 percent.   
 More deeply, the people who are going to lose their jobs or get sick are going to do these things 
no matter where they live (to a first approximation).  Some landlord is going to have to bear this cost.  
The time and energy that landlords devote to screening for this possibility is pure waste from a social 
perspective, since the only goal is to make some other landlord bear this cost instead of themselves.  It 
is just a game of hot potato.  Similarly the distorting contracts menus designed to combat adverse 
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selection create obvious deadweight social losses, but are useful only for playing hot potato. Whether 
they combat adverse selection well or not is irrelevant, as long as they are costly. 
 In this sense, by making landlords less concerned with where people are living when adverse 
events occur, rental insurance can promote efficiency.  A formal analysis of this issue has not been done 
yet, and would be helpful. 
 On the other hand, rental insurance might work against efficiency by decreasing geographic 
mobility—“locking in” people to the wrong locations when, for instance, jobs have shifted elsewhere. 
These efficiency costs, however, may not be large, since rental insurance payments would probably last 
less than six months, and migration decisions often take longer than that. 
  
 1.2.3  Why can’t provide private firms provide this insurance? 
 Maybe they can, but because of the external costs of homelessness and instability, they would 
have to be subsidized.   
 Rental insurance markets, however, are likely to suffer from adverse selection.  Prospective 
tenants are likely to have private information about their health and employment situation, and so may 
small landlords.  Landlords also have private information about the channels through which they recruit 
tenants.   
 Subsidies offset adverse selection, and a private subsidized insurance scheme might be viable.  
But it might be better for HUD to start a program with a large, mainly involuntary base built in.  For 
instance, apartment buildings and multi-family houses with FHA or GSE backing might be required to 
purchase such insurance.  The history of mortgage insurance shows that sometimes the government 
needs to get a market started. 
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1.2.4 What about moral hazard? 
 Like every other kind of insurance, rental insurance will cause some moral hazard problems.  
Intelligent design can reduce the size of these problems when they occur. 
 On the landlord side, the obvious behavioral response to rental insurance is to loosen screening 
standards.  This loosening may be desirable, in part to reduce homelessness.  Nor is it obvious that 
markets produce optimal screening standards.  Screening by landlord A affects the pool of prospective 
tenants that landlord B sees, and hence the standards that landlord B finds it optimal to adopt.  So the 
social costs of moral hazard on the landlord side may not be particularly big. 
 On the tenant side, several behavioral responses may occur.  Tenants may seek higher quality 
and higher rent apartments because they have less to fear if something goes wrong; they may also seek 
riskier jobs because they have less to fear if the job falls through.  The social costs of these behavioral 
changes may not be large.  On the other hand, tenants may work less diligently at their jobs or take less 
good care of their health.  This is a real concern, but the amounts involved are modest and the claw-
back provisions can be adjusted to offset this behavior. 
 Fraud may also occur, of course.  Landlords, for instance, could invent fictitious tenants.  We 
need to learn a lot about how to run these programs right. 
1.2.5 Whom is this for? 
 Rental insurance is a complement to existing HUD low-income assistance programs, not a 
substitute for them.  These programs have a variety of goals, and I can’t comment on all of those goals 
in this paper.  Unlike these existing programs, however, it is meant to be an entitlement, and so should 
be one way of mitigating the unfairness of denying assistance to some households while giving large 
amounts of assistance to other households that are in no obvious way more deserving. 
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 Because rental insurance is an entitlement, HUD-assisted tenants should be able to purchase it.  
This would probably make HUD’s current programs work a little better.  Currently, the risk of tenant 
non-payment is borne by public housing authorities and a multitude of investors and landlords.  Many of 
these are unsophisticated, risk averse, and geographically undiversified; many of them also worry about 
cash constraints at times of recession.  Rental insurance for HUD-assisted tenants shifts some of this risk 
to the national level, where it can be handled much better.  A more efficient allocation of risk should 
reduce the per household cost of these programs (including any losses from rental insurance), and allow 
them to serve a few more households. 
 Should rich people be eligible for rental insurance, too? I don’t see why not; healthy people are 
eligible to buy medical insurance.  Whether tenants need the help depends on their current 
circumstances, not their past circumstances, and eligibility rules have to be based on past 
circumstances.  But if federally sponsored insurance is losing money and rich people are heavily 
involved, the subsidy should be reduced so that private companies can enter the market.  The danger in 
operating a program without explicit income guidelines is that it might be relatively more attractive to 
rich people than poor.  If this were to happen, the program parameters could be adjusted in cost-neutral 
ways to make it more attractive to poor people and relatively less attractive to rich—for instance, by 
reducing up-front premiums and raising claw-back percentages. 
 Of course, rental insurance is not ready for wide-scale adoption yet.  To learn about how it 
works, starting with specific groups defined by hard-to-change characteristics would be informative and 
probably productive.  For instance, young adults aging out of foster care and returning veterans are two 
groups that often have trouble finding and keeping apartments.  Rental insurance could open doors for 
them with landlords who might otherwise fear rent delinquencies, and provide social agencies with 




 Designing a practical rental insurance program is tough.  A large number of parameters and 
details must be chosen carefully and consistently. For many questions, experience will have to be the 
only guide.  Some relevant experience is available to draw on: Insurent, the Veterans’ Administration 
mortgage insurance program, and the emergency payment systems that some social service agencies 
run all have some similarities to rental insurance. But real experience can be acquired only through real 
experiments. 
 
2.0 Better neighbors 
 The basic low-income housing subsidy programs were designed many years ago to address the 
problems that bothered people then. Structural conditions seem to have been the major concern. If 
people lived in houses that were too small, or too drafty, or without enough sunlight, or without proper 
water and sewer connections, they and their children would not be healthy, physically or morally.  Their 
ill health would spread by contagion and crime. So the entire society would gain by improving the 
structural conditions of the housing of the poor. Thus public housing in the 1930s and even Housing 
Choice Vouchers in the 1970s contained strict rules about structural characteristics, but almost no rules 
about location. 
 Times have changed.  Structural quality of unsubsidized housing stock has improved 
tremendously, especially at the bottom of the distribution.  The rest of the nation has become more 
concerned about how well poor kids read, and less about whether they have tuberculosis.  We worry 
about diabetes and fast food outlets, not polio and poor ventilation.  Crime remains a great concern, but 
the causes are seen less as inadequate sunlight and more as inadequate role models. 
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 The externalities, in other words, now come more from location and less from structure. I have 
never seen a complete study of subsidized housing location externalities in this sense. I don’t know if 
one could reasonably be done.  However, something is known about some of the relevant parameters.   
 In this section, I’ll look at how housing location affects what kind of citizens residents are or 
become—the traditional focus of housing policy (especially ownership policy).  Health, jobs, and 
education will be my concerns here.  In section 3, I’ll look briefly at two other possible externalities of 
subsidized housing: how it affects the value of neighboring properties, and how tenant selection affects 
the cost of other public programs.  The final section is about crime, which brings all of these issues 
together. 
I’ll concentrate on very specific, hopefully measurable externalities.  I will not ask big questions 
like whether subsidized housing should be in rich neighborhoods or minority neighborhoods.  An 
enormous amount has been written on these questions, and I don’t see any consensus.  I think there is 
consensus, however, on more direct issues like carbon monoxide, particulate matter, bad schools, and 
long commutes; we can also put numbers on these costs.  Maybe the difficulty with the big concepts is 
that they are really amalgams of small concepts.  I will concentrate on these areas because the science is 
pretty well known.  I can think about trees a lot better than I can think about forests. 
 
2.1 Health 
2.1.0 Basic empirical results 
 Recent empirical work in health economics establishes a few fairly strong links from location to 
health.  Currie et al. (2009, 2010a) and Currie and Walker (2010) find that higher carbon monoxide levels 
induce greater school absenteeism and poor infant health outcomes, even at low levels.  Living close to 
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traffic congestion is bad for kids.  There is also substantial evidence that particulate matter is harmful.  
(These dangers seem to be quite localized, with impacts measured in hundreds of feet; census tracts are 
too coarse.)  Currie et al. (2010b) find that children with more access to fast-food restaurants are more 
obese.   
2.1.1  Exogenous nuisances 
 First, suppose that the location and intensity of noxious sites is fixed and exogenous. Then the 
role of housing policy is to discourage people from living near them.  (In the next section I will examine 
the more realistic case of endogenous nuisances; my method is to proceed from the simple to the 
complex.) 
 In a perfectly functioning private housing market, this would be no problem.  Housing 
consumers, realizing that living near these sites was harmful, would lower their bid-rent by the full 
amount of the damage.  No houses would be built near the noxious sites if the lowered bid rent were 
not enough to pay for structure and to bid the land away from non-residential uses. If houses were built, 
the residents would be compensated for the harm by lower rents, and the landowner would bear the 
damage cost. 
 Subsidized housing as it is now run short-circuits this adjustment.  To a large extent, the rent 
that a landlord receives is independent of the attractiveness of the location.  This holds whether the 
landlord is a public housing authority (PHA), or a private landlord with Housing Choice Vouchers tenants.  
Everything else being equal, the absence of location in the subsidy formula is an incentive to place 
subsidized tenants in the worst possible locations.  For supply-side projects, this is because land is 
cheapest (hence forgone property taxes are the least) in those locations. For Housing Choice Vouchers, 
this is because the opportunity cost of renting to a subsidized tenant is least there.  Thus we expect 
current assistance programs to do worse than the market would in promoting tenant health, not better. 
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 But even doing as well as the market does is not good enough.  Tenants do not pay the full cost 
of poor health, and parents do not fully internalize the health of their children (especially in the long 
run).  Tenants may also not be aware of the best current research. The argument for subsidized housing 
can only be that it does a better job than the market. 
 (That is why the many exceptions to the picture of complete independence of rent from location 
amenities do not change the basic picture.  Landlords of Housing Choice Vouchers tenants with rent 
above fair market rent (FMR) receive the full value of any change in bid rent at the margin, and so will 
locate away from nuisances, at least those that are smaller than the difference between actual rent and 
FMR.  Developers planning developments that include both market rate units and subsidized units like 
Hope VI will bear the cost of nuisances to the extent that part of the project is unsubsidized at the 
margin, but they will bear only a fraction of the true cost.) 
 Can current housing assistance programs be revamped so that they do the job they should be 
doing?  The answer is yes and the strategy is obvious: make the federal subsidy depend on how healthy 
the location is.  For most programs, the subsidy should decrease dollar-for-dollar with the increase in 
the total cost of health-related problems associated with the site.  For instance, the penalty per housing 
unit for a project located near a congested highway should equal the sum of private health costs the 
tenants will bear because of their exposure to the highway (their willingness to pay to be free of the 
morbidity and enhanced mortality associated with the pollution) plus the medical costs that third parties 
and governments will bear.  The same penalty is relevant for Housing Choice Vouchers where the tenant 
is not paying anything on the margin.  For Housing Choice Vouchers where the rent is greater than FMR, 
the landlord is already bearing some of the health costs; the penalty should equal only the external costs 
in this situation (although “external” may, for instance, include most of children’s costs). 
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 Notice that nothing in this proposal necessarily raises or lowers aggregate subsidies.  HUD can 
either penalize unhealthy locations or reward healthy locations, or do a combination of both.  Some 
combination will be expenditure-neutral.  In some ways, this proposal just asks HUD to calculate “fair 
market rents” in a way that recognizes location, not just structure: the fair market rent for an apartment 
in a lousy location is not the same as the fair market rent for an apartment in a great location, and HUD 
should recognize this. 
 This basic proposal does not specify whether changes in subsidy should manifest themselves as 
changes in payments to landlords or changes in rents paid by tenants.  As we introduce further 
complications, this issue will be resolved. 
 One may also ask whether this problem would be better addressed by rules than monetary 
payments.  HUD uses rules to establish minimum structural standards which every subsidized housing 
unit must meet; why not use minimum location standards too?  There are many interesting economic 
arguments around this question in general, but in this case the advice of practicality is pretty direct.  I 
fear that a very large fraction of currently assisted housing would fail any minimum location standards 
that HUD could with good conscience promulgate.  Rather than mandate healthy living, this proposal 
“nudges” tenants and landlords toward it. 
2.1.2 Endogenous nuisances 
 The argument above treats the locations of noxious activities as fixed. They are not, and 
efficiency may require that the noxious activities move or lower the intensity of their operations.  
Nuisance corrections in housing assistance formulas make these efficient outcomes more likely. 
 Suppose first we are in a Coasian world.  The Coase theorem implies an efficient outcome if the 
parties can bargain costlessly.  Efficiency still fails in the current system because children and third-party 
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payers of medical costs are affected parties who are unlikely to take part in any bargaining with the 
nuisance-source.  Nuisance corrections in this sense set the table properly for Coasian bargaining. 
 Transactions-cost reasoning also implies that nuisance corrections should affect landlord 
payments, not tenant rents. If the landlord internalizes all the nuisance costs that the tenants (and 
others) bear, she becomes the proper person to negotiate with the nuisance-source; the free-rider 
problem is mitigated or eliminated. 
 Much of this Coasian reasoning carries over into a world where nuisances are regulated by state 
and local governments, not by Coasian bargains.  A landlord who has internalized the nuisance 
externality has good reason to lobby for stricter regulation of the nuisance, since she will gain from any 
mitigation. Big landlords and PHAs often lobby well. 
 (An alternative approach would be for HUD to tax nuisances near subsidized housing.  Efficiency 
would be achieved if nuisance-sources could pay subsidized-housing decision-makers not to locate near 
them.  Such a system would probably be legally and administratively unworkable.) 
2.1.3 Tenants without subsidies 
 Imposing a system of nuisance corrections will have three possible outcomes for any apartment 
that is now subsidized. 
 The first outcome is that it continues to be subsidized.  In that case, there is no efficiency gain, 
unless the nuisance is abated, since the physical fact of harm will continue. 
 The second outcome is that the apartment ceases to be subsidized, but continues to be a 
residence.  In that case, there is no efficiency gain either; only the name of the household being harmed 
is changed.  But the landlord bears the private cost of the nuisance in lower rent, and so has a greater 
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incentive to bargain or lobby for abatement than a subsidized landlord under the current system does 
(though not so great as a subsidized landlord in the improved system would have), 
 Finally, nuisance corrections may cause the site to be abandoned for residential use; it might 
become a parking lot or a warehouse.  This is clearly an efficiency gain if the nuisance is large and cannot 
be abated; it cuts exposure.   
 Thus under any outcome there is potential for efficiency gains.  The fact that under some 
circumstances nuisance corrections will only change the name of the household getting sick does not 
vitiate the scheme’s utility.  Over time, moreover, the efficiency effects are likely to grow: for instance, 
as stores or single-family houses are built where multi-family subsidized housing might have been built. 
2.1.4 Equity 
 Are there equity impacts as well as efficiency impacts?  Definitely, but they depend on many 
important details of how the programs are implemented and how the market responds. 
 If the nuisance is abated, there are likely to equity gains as well as efficiency gains.  The people 
the nuisance would have been harming are poor, and those who bear the ultimate cost of abatement 
are probably not all poor.  In many cases, moreover, the nuisances are local public bads, and so their 
abatement may benefit unsubsidized households as well as subsidized, at least until rents adjust.  If the 
nuisance is not abated, but the area it affects becomes a parking lot or warehouse, the equity 
implications are similar. 
 If the nuisance is not abated and subsidized tenants continue living next to it, there is little 
equity impact.  Taxpayers gain and the landlord loses if the subsidy goes down. 
 The case where the nuisance is not abated and unsubsidized tenants replace the subsidized 
tenants is slightly more complicated.  The equity implications depend on how the subsidies account for 
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externalities—whether the reform punishes unhealthy locations relative to the status quo, or rewards 
healthy locations.  If the reform raises average subsidies by rewarding more than punishing, then the 
gap in well-being between subsidized and unsubsidized tenants widens—a result that is probably 
undesirable from an equity viewpoint—and landlords gain at the expense of taxpayers.  If the reform 
punishes bad locations instead of rewarding good ones, on average, the result is the opposite, generally.  
This is what you would expect intuitively. 
 How does this work out on the ground?  Consider a reform that only rewards good locations.  
The subsidized tenant moves to a healthier apartment, because the new apartment’s landlord is now 
willing to accept the larger subsidy HUD is offering.  The non-recipient who would otherwise be renting 
that apartment is worse off, and possibly less healthy, too. The landlord of the new apartment is better 
off.  Some non-recipient ends up in the old apartment, but we cannot say whether that non-recipient is 
healthier or not, since we don’t know where that household would have been living otherwise.  So in 
this case, the gap between recipients and non-recipients widens. 
 In the other case, when the reform punishes bad locations, the subsidized tenant leaves an 
unhealthy apartment because the landlord can get more from an unsubsidized tenant than from the 
subsidy.  The new unsubsidized tenant is no worse off than she would have been in the absence of the 
reform, and probably is better off, because she moved willingly from her old apartment, even though 
she may be less healthy.  The subsidized tenant is living somewhere else and is probably healthier, but 
we don’t know whether she is better off or not.  In this case, the gap in well-being between poor 
recipients and non-recipients does not necessarily widen, and non-recipients become better off. Existing 
subsidized landlords lose. 
 
2.2 Job access and commuting cost 
19 
 
 The arguments about job access and commuting cost are similar to the arguments about health 
and need not be repeated.  In the private market, apartments with better job access and lower 
commuting costs command higher rents, and so land prices absorb these advantages.  Subsidized 
landlords realize no such premium, and so have an incentive to choose locations with horrible access, 
and no incentive to lobby for nearby jobs or more convenient commuting.  HUD does worse than the 
market. 
 The solution is for HUD to pay greater subsidies for apartments with better job access 
(calculations very similar to those involved in such subsidies can be found in Fisher et al 2009).  Jobs 
have external benefits—taxes, good example, psychological well-being (see Phelps 1997), and 
commuting has external costs, and so the proper corrections for HUD are likely to be somewhat larger 
than the corrections the private land market makes. 
 
2.3 Education 
 To the extent that educational quality depends only on school inputs, observed or unobserved, 
we can carry over the same logic we applied to health and job access.  HUD should pay landlords more 
for apartments near great schools, less for apartments near lousy schools, and the correction should be 
greater than the premium that the private land market reflects, because education produces 
considerable external benefits.  PHAs and landlords under such a system would become active 
advocates for better schools.  (They have little or no stake in good schools now, and so school districts 
with large amounts of subsidized housing do not feel the same sort of economic pressure to perform 
well that other school districts feel.) 
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 Education, however, is more complicated than health or jobs.  Peers matter, not just school 
inputs, for both cognitive and non-cognitive outputs.  The details of peer effects are important for policy 
design, however, and in some plausible cases it is best to ignore them altogether. 
 Suppose, for instance, that peer effects are linear.  By that I mean that the expected gain a 
student experiences from having better peers is independent of the student’s initial level.  The relevant 
metric for gain here is not test scores, which are unique only to a monotone transform, but willingness 
to pay (WTP) (assuming that capital markets are perfect and all post-education externalities are 
internalized).  Then the net effect of any student transfers among equally sized classes is zero: whatever 
students gain in one class students in the other class lose. 
 My reading of the literature on peer effects in education indicates that there is no strong reason 
to reject linearity in test scores, and that close to nothing is known about linearity in WTP.  Linearity 
would thus seem to be an appropriate assumption on which to base policy.  HUD would then ignore 
peer externalities, since they sum to zero, and pay for school quality based only on school inputs.  The 
Department of Education seems dedicated to developing measures of school quality, independent of 
student body composition, and so HUD can use their conclusions.  It is important for this program that 
the measures of school quality be independent of student body composition.  The purpose is not to 
induce the children of subsidized tenants to run away from other poor children. 
 The interesting question in this case is whether the subsidy should depend on what the 
inhabitants of the apartment do.  Should a PHA be rewarded for siting senior housing in a great school 
district, or be penalized for lousy neighborhood schools if most resident kids go to good charter schools?  
Since the goal is to spur education, not to imitate the land market, the penalty or reward should depend 
on the actual children and the actual schools.  This promotes efficiency.  A PHA, for instance, faced with 
poor neighborhood schools will decide for itself whether to try to improve these schools or give its 
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residents incentives to send their kids elsewhere.  Buildings closest to the worst schools will end up 
being predominantly seniors, as they should be. 
 The most reasonable alternative assumption to linearity is quality-complementarity: better 
students gain more than worse students from better peers.  Quality-complementarity is the social 
justification for the elite university that employs me, and so while the empirical evidence is meager, I 
ought to consider its implications.  Quality-complementarity implies that good students should be 
matched with good students, and poor with poor.  A competitive market would create the efficient 
outcome, because better students would outbid worse students to be with the best students. 
 In a world with quality-complementarity, poor students from assisted housing might attend 
schools with better peers than the social optimum would assign them to, and so impose net costs on 
other students (the losers are the students they attend school with and the students who would 
otherwise have attended school with these students; the other winners are the students whose peers 
are better because they are not attending school with the students from assisted housing).  If this is a 
problem, it can be corrected by assessing penalties on landlords when children end up in the bottom 
part of their classes.  This penalty reflects the net external harm a student does by being in the wrong 
school.  (Alternatively, landlords could be rewarded when students are at the top of their classes.) 
 Such grade schemes may be difficult to administer, and they are justified only by empirical 
results that have not been found yet.  So I don’t advocate them seriously.  But they show that 
externalities created by housing residents themselves are not impossible to manage well. 
3.0 Other kinds of externalities 
3.1 Effects on neighbors 
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 Subsidized housing affects the value of surrounding properties.  John Quigley reviews this 
literature.  To the extent that the external benefits are the same across locations, they are an argument 
for subsidized housing per se, not for any changes in formula.  But if the external benefits differ in 
different settings, then HUD subsidies to landlords should reward settings that are more beneficial to 
neighbors. 
 These externalities interact with the ones we have discussed already.  If PHAs or subsidized 
landlords become advocates for cleaner air, more frequent bus service, and better schools, the 
neighbors will gain too.  Subsidized housing tenants may also gain if neighboring properties are more 
valuable—for instance, they may be less likely to be rented to fast-food outlets or to be taken over by 
drug-dealers.   This is speculation, however. 
3.2 Tenant selection 
 Who receives subsidies can also affect what taxpayers are asked to cover for other programs 
and how other citizens experience the world.  The big issue here is homelessness.  A tenancy that 
reduces homelessness is more valuable than one that does not, ceteris paribus.  Since homelessness is 
intrinsically hard to predict, and because existing tenant selection processes are formalized, basing 
payments on probability of homelessness is not likely to be a good idea.  But practices that alter the mix 
of tenants in the direction of high-homeless-probability people should be encouraged.  The best 
predictor of future homelessness is current homelessness, and so landlords and PHAs should be 
encouraged to select tenants from shelters and streets (through programs like Housing First).  They 
should also be encouraged to serve more single non-elderly adults, since most homeless people are 
single adults (another reason why tenant-subsidy formulas should be sharing-neutral).  Current income 




4.0 Crime and safety 
 Concerns about crime and safety have dominated discussion of subsidized housing during the 
last two decades.  I’ll begin with the easy issues and progress to the harder ones. 
4.1 Long-run criminogenic influences 
 The traditional concern in housing discussions has been how the circumstances under which 
children grow up affect their propensity to commit index crimes in adolescence and adulthood. 
 The strongest result on this score is that exposure to lead in childhood is very bad (Reyes 2007) 
(for reasons of education as well as crime).  Children can be exposed to lead in paint and lead in the 
atmosphere.  HUD guidelines that prohibit leaded paint—a structural issue—are thus a major crime-
fighting tool.  Since leaded gasoline was phased out in the 1980s, I am unaware of how atmospheric lead 
concentrations vary.  It would be good to know this.  Treating atmospheric lead as a nuisance in the 
ways I described in section 2.1 could thus cause a long-run reduction in crime, if there still are 
meaningful differences in atmospheric lead concentration. 
 Another strong result is that education reduces future crime (Lochner and Moretti 2004, 
Lochner 2010).  The steps I outlined in section 2.3 therefore reduce crime. 
 Aside from these to results, I’m not aware of any other strong results about childhood 
experiences that cause future criminality.  In particular, nothing about architecture, poverty 
concentration, or public housing seems to make kids grow up to be criminals.  I take this to be the 
conclusion of Jacob (2004) and Oreopoulos (2003). 
 Thus to reduce long-run criminality, HUD should continue to be vigilant about structural lead 
paint, penalize atmospheric lead, and reward good schools in the ways I have discussed. 
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4.2 Short-run criminogenic influences 
 Other neighborhood features may increase or decrease the total volume of crime more 
immediately.  Landlords should be rewarded for locating in neighborhoods that have good features, and 
penalized for locating in neighborhoods that have bad features. 
 Unfortunately, I don’t know much about what these good and bad features are.  Folklore says 
that liquor stores and bars are a bad feature, and perhaps churches are a good feature, but I’m not 
aware of any hard evidence on these questions (Gyimah-Brempong (2006) tries to connect liquor stores 
and crime, but does not have a convincing identification strategy).  Wilson and Kelling (1982) argue that 
visible disorder in a neighborhood (“broken windows”) encourages crime, but this hypothesis has not 
fared well empirically (Fagan and Davies 2000, Harcourt and Ludwig 2006).  DiTella and Schargrodsky 
(2004) show that police patrol reduces crime in a natural experiment.  But police patrol levels are usually 
correlated with unobserved features that increase crime—police patrol more in dangerous 
neighborhoods—and so it makes little sense to reward landlords in neighborhoods with greater police 
presence. 
 Dahl and Della Vigna (2009), however, find that violent movies tend to incapacitate violent 
people while they watch them, and that these people don’t compensate fully for the period of 
incapacitation after the movies. Perhaps landlords should be rewarded for locating near theaters that 
show violent movies.   
 In general, incentives should be based on evidence, not speculation.  Hence only violent movies 
should even be considered at this point as a short-run criminogenic influence. 
4.3 Short-run neighborhood effects 
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 NIMBY fits in here.  People who live in subsidized housing may tend to commit more crimes than 
wealthier Americans, and so their unsubsidized neighbors may be upset about their presence. Perhaps 
victimization of neighbors may be an external cost of subsidized housing that should be internalized.  
 This reasoning, however, is incomplete.  Suppose that some subsidized tenants have a high 
propensity to commit index crimes against their neighbors. Moving them from neighborhood A to 
neighborhood B hurts the people in neighborhood B, but helps the people in neighborhood A.  To the 
extent that the location of subsidized housing affects merely the location of crime, not its volume or 
severity, it should be of no social concern.  (An analogy is domestic violence: to a first approximation at 
least, where a family is living when a domestic violence incident occurs is of no concern.) 
 It’s possible to tell all sorts of stories about the type of neighborhoods where crime should be 
most costly, but there is little empirical evidence.  For instance, bringing poor people into a rich 
neighborhood might increase burglary because there is more to steal, but it might decrease motor 
vehicle theft because cars are more likely to be in garages at night.  White neighborhoods might 
encourage robbery because whites are less likely to resist, but blacks tend to carry more cash 
(O’Flaherty and Sethi 2008).  Dense neighborhoods present more criminals with more targets, but also 
confront them with more potential witnesses. 
 The Moving to Opportunity experiment (MTO) sheds some light on this issue, but not much. 
Boys who moved to richer neighborhoods committed a few more crimes than those who stayed in 
poorer neighborhoods, and this suggests that richer neighborhoods are relatively criminogenic in the 
short run.  But we don’t know the net change in crime in either set of neighborhoods (the extent to 
which crimes committed by MTO boys would have been committed by someone else if the MTO boys 
were not around).  Nor does MTO tell us much about older potential criminals. 
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 Until more research is done, then, it seems best to consider criminal effects on neighbors as 
essentially a wash in social terms. 
4.4 Index crime between tenants 
 The same conclusion applies to index crimes between tenants.  If some prospective tenants are 
likely to commit crimes against their neighbors, it doesn’t matter who their prospective victims are: HUD 
has no dog in this fight.  (Indeed, fairness—of the Rawlsian variety anyway—suggests that if HUD should 
protect someone, it is those poor people who are not lucky enough to receive subsidies; hence HUD 
should not be eager to dump criminals on the unlucky poor people who don’t get subsidies.) 
4.5 Street vice 
 By street vice, Sethi and I (2010) mean illegal commercial transactions involving a willing seller 
and a willing buyer, where the seller deals with many buyers, but has ongoing relationships with few of 
them, and where buyer and seller must come together in close physical proximity.  Open-air, 
anonymous drug-selling is the variety of street vice that receives the most attention, and presents 
special issues for HUD. 
 Street vice is a business (and almost certainly a business smaller than clandestine, relationship-
based drug-selling) that locates where it’s most profitable to locate. Sethi and I (2010) set out several 
reasons why street vice tends to be concentrated in African-American neighbhorhoods, even though 
drug demand is not concentrated in these neighborhoods.  Street vice carries with it considerable 
negative external costs for the surrounding neighborhood. 
 Within any neighborhood, the best locations for street vice depend on physical features that 
have not been studied—perhaps easy access to highways or clear sightlines in many directions, for 
instance.  Many housing projects seem to have been built with these features, whatever they are. The 
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setting within African-American neighborhoods, the heavy concentration of potential low-wage workers, 
the small number of immigrants, the distinctive architectural style, the frequent presence of people 
outside—all of these might make many housing projects attractive places for street vice. Hence in many 
neighborhoods HUD-assisted housing, particularly public housing, may be among the best locations for 
street vice.  It would be good to know this for sure. 
 The obvious solution to this problem is the legalization of most currently illicit drugs or the 
subsidization of good substitutes.  Such a program, however, is not within HUD’s purview. 
 This situation presents two kinds of problems for HUD. 
 One problem is how to reduce street vice in developments that have not been built yet.  
Obviously research needs to be done on the structural and locational correlates of street vice.  Future 
developments should be designed with these in mind. 
 To some extent, of course, better architecture will just shift street vice to less lucrative 
locations; if that were the case, the investment would be misdirected.  As long as the supply of street 
vice sites is far from perfectly elastic, there will be real effects.  While the elasticity of demand for illicit 
drugs is low, it is not zero, and the elasticity of demand for anonymously-purchased illicit drugs is almost 
certainly higher than the overall elasticity of demand.  Hence making HUD’s buildings less attractive 
places for street vice may not just dump the externalities on someone else. (Clandestine drug sales have 
considerably lower external costs than anonymous sales.)  Moreover, to the extent that HUD-assisted 
developments are more densely populated than other neighborhoods where street vice might locate in 
the same city, moving street vice away from these developments reduces the external costs that street 
vice produces, even if the total volume does not change.   
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 Buildings that have already been built present a different issue.  Street vice is a neighborhood 
blight just like air pollution, and so the basic response should be to reduce landlord subsidies when 
street vice is occurring nearby.  The difficulty with this approach is measurement: you can’t reward or 
punish people for something you don’t credibly and verifiably measure.  Arrests, for instance, are 
evidence of action being taken against drug-selling, not of street vice or even drug-selling.  HUD, 
however, could employ testers on a random basis to try to buy drugs anonymously in or near assisted 
housing, or subsidize local police departments to do so.  Testing programs might create big risks for 
landlords if they sampled too little, and would be very expensive if they sampled too much; the 
definition of “near” would also produce other tradeoffs.  But sampling programs are a straightforward 
attempt to provide the right incentives, and so some decent tradeoff might be found. 
 Maybe a better measurement strategy would be to look at reported violent outdoor index crime 
(excluding rape and domestic violence) and shootings in the vicinity of HUD-assisted housing.  This is 
actually measured, and may be closer to the thing that should be measured.  The external costs of street 
vice are the problem, not street vice itself, and so landlords should have incentives to minimize these 
costs.  (As technology becomes cheaper, HUD might want to install shot-monitoring devices on all 
assisted housing; this could serve deterrence as well as incentive purposes.) 
4.6 One-strike rules 
 Direct incentives like these are likely to be more effective than one-strike rules because they 
address the real problem—index crime and street vice near HUD-assisted housing—rather than some 
variant—index crime and street vice by HUD-assisted tenants.  No serious empirical evaluation of one-




 To understand the theory, think about McDonald’s.  Suppose in some future world, the US 
Congress is dominated by vegetarians who, while ethical, are not particularly bright.  To discourage 
meat-eating, they order periodic surprise raids on McDonald’s restaurants.  In these raids, they detain 
all the employees.  Any HUD-assisted tenants among the employees are evicted immediately; other 
employees are blacklisted so they may never receive HUD assistance in the future.   
 What does this policy do?  It raises the price of hamburgers a little bit and raises the wage of 
hamburger-flippers, but many substitutes for HUD tenants and aspiring tenants are available, and so the 
effect is not large.  Most importantly, it doesn’t substantially change the locations that McDonald’s 
chooses for its restaurants.  If McDonald’s found it profitable to put a restaurant near or inside a HUD-
assisted project before the dim-witted vegetarians took over, it will almost certainly continue to find it 
profitable. 
 Since it appears that labor is supplied to street vice pretty elastically (Reuter et al. 1990), the 
drug-selling one-strike rule should have the same effect on street vice locations—approximately 
nothing.  That’s why a serious empirical evaluation would be helpful.  (Essentially the question is 
whether the elasticity of land supply to anonymousdrug-selling is less than the elasticity of labor supply 
to anonymous drug-selling.) 
 The current one-strike rule, moreover, imposes real costs on tenants and prospective tenants—
breaking up families, for instance.  Treating young single adult minority males as pariahs contributes to 
many social problems that have large external costs—homelessness and homicide, for instance. In 
thinking about the role of subsidized housing in the larger society, HUD may want to move toward a 
more goal-oriented and less soundbite-oriented policy.  Landlords in a goal-oriented regime may very 





 You don’t have to do all this stuff tomorrow.  Just remember that a safety net today is different 
from a safety net in the 1930s, and externalities today are different too.  All the rest follows. 
 
Note 
1.  Programs have sharing disincentives when they give larger per person subsidies to smaller 
households.  Almost all existing HUD programs have sharing disincentives.  Programs are 
sharing-neutral when the size of the subsidy is not affected by the number of adults one shares 
housing with.  See He et al., 2010, for a discussion of possible reasons for sharing disincentives, 
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